Wikileaks and consequences for modern diplomacy – observations by a foreign policy practitioner by Møller, Jørgen Ørstrøm
Wikileaks did not reveal much, we did not know 
about U.S. foreign policy already. The true revela-
tions were – as many had suspected – that some 
foreign leaders pursue a different foreign policy 
agenda than the offi cial one. Sources providing 
information to foreign diplomats will be more pru-
dent from now on. The main impact is a new type 
of diplomacy bypassing leaders to communicate 
directly with the people – increasing people’s 
power and highlighting the growing importance 
of civic society and the social media.
 Wikileaks and raison d’état
At the Peace Conference in 1918 after World War I, U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson, often seen as the founding 
father of the idealist streak in American diplomacy, stated 
his fourteen points to secure a lasting world peace. He set 
out by stating the following:
“We entered this war because violations of right 
had occurred which touched us to the quick and 
made the life of our own people impossible unless 
they were corrected and the world secure once 
for all against their recurrence. What we demand 
in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to 
ourselves. It is that the world be made fi t and safe 
to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for 
every peace-loving nation which, like our own, 
wishes to live its own life, determine its own 
institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing 
by the other peoples of the world as against force 
and selfi sh aggression. All the peoples of the 
world are in effect partners in this interest, and for 
our own part we see very clearly that unless 
justice be done to others it will not be done to us. 
The program of the world’s peace, therefore, is 
our program; and that program, the only possible 
program, as we see it, is this.”
Wilson then continues to present his fourteen points of 
which the banishment of ‘secret diplomacy’ is the most 
well known and undeniably the most important to his 
own mind. Th is can be concluded from the simple obser-
vation that it was the fi rst one on his list:
“Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after 
which there shall be no private international 
understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view.”1
Th e underlying principle here is the conviction that 
World War I was caused by secret undertakings and cov-
ert agreements among the Great Powers of Europe, guar-
anteeing to support each other in case of war. So when 
Russia felt it was necessary to counteract the Austrian-
Hungarian aggression against Serbia, Germany had to 
support Austria-Hungary, which in turn forced France 
to become involved as well. Such a network of alliances 
made negotiations impossible and dragged peoples into 
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What is often overlooked, however, is that Great 
Britain – the most crucial Great Power – went to war to 
support France, not as a result of any treaties or secret 
undertaking, but rather because of informal consulta-
tions and coordination on a lower level – albeit tying the 
hands of the government in no less stringent a manner. 
It underlines, however, that despite all kind of commit-
ments, it is extremely diffi  cult – if not impossible – to 
box nation-states and their diplomacy into a strait jacket 
of rules that may force them to act against their interests.
As the French Foreign Minister retorted in those fi rst 
days of August 1914 when asked by the German Ambas-
sador, how France would act if Germany went to war with 
Russia, he replied: “La France agira selon ses interest”2. 
Diplomacy is an instrument for nation-states to pursue 
their interests. No treaty, no agreement, no undertaking, 
nor anything else that can be put on the table will compel 
a nation-state to act against its interests. Formalities can-
not bend realities.
When trying to distil the eff ects of Wikileaks for 
future diplomacy, raison d’état stands out as the fi rst ob-
servation, but ultimately also the conclusion. Th e aware-
ness that information may be made public – despite the 
government’s wishes – may change the working methods 
and instruments chosen by diplomacy, but not its raison 
d’etre – to pursue and safeguard interests.
In the following we will fi rst discuss secret diplomacy 
versus non-secret (open) diplomacy. Th en the essay will 
examine what we learned from Wikileaks and how Infor-
mation and Communication Technology (ICT) changes 
diplomacy. Finally the essay will conclude with expecta-
tions for the future of modern diplomacy. 
Secret versus non-secret diplomacy
It should not be overlooked that there are indeed good 
reasons for secret diplomacy, even if abuses unveiled by 
history has discredited such undertakings.
One explanation – not necessarily a good one, but 
nonetheless one often used – is that foreign policy is a 
topic best dealt with outside the normal sphere of domes-
tic policy processes. Th e reasoning goes that the majority 
of parliamentarians and especially the majority of voters 
do not have suffi  cient foreign policy insight to adopt a 
sensible attitude towards complex foreign policy issues. 
In Denmark this reasoning is institutionalized in the for-
eign policy committee, which is anchored in the Danish 
Constitution, § 19.3. Th is is the only example of a Par-
liamentary Committee being mentioned in the Constitu-
tion – clearly an indication that foreign policy is ‘special’. 
Th ere may, however, be some truth to this view, pri-
marily because diplomats are supposed to – and fortu-
nately in most cases do – know more about the circum-
stances and dispositions of foreign nation-states. Th e fact, 
which is diffi  cult to overlook, is that people who have 
lived their entire life inside a nation-state are likely to ex-
pect other nation-states to act analogously, while people 
having lived outside the borders (i.e. diplomats) know 
that this is not necessarily the case.
A good illustration of this can be found in the U.S. 
policy towards the People’s Republic of China in the 
beginning of the 1970’s when President Nixon and his 
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger fundamen-
tally revised U.S. policy towards China through secret 
negotiations. Nixon and Kissinger would probably never 
have been able to perform this diplomatic act, had they 
been forced into an open debate. Th e perception of China 
among the large majority of Americans and indeed the 
majority of members of the U.S. Congress would have 
blocked such an initiative. Admittedly this perception 
was fuelled by decades of American propaganda depict-
ing China as an evil communist power. Nixon and Kiss-
inger knew, however, that to counteract the Soviet Union 
and force it into agreements on weapons control, China 
was an indispensable card to be played in the dawning 
Triangular Diplomacy. 
In Denmark we have also had our share of secret 
diplomacy. In 1957 there was secret acknowledgement by 
senior offi  cials in the Danish government of ‘ammunition 
of a distinctive character’ to be stored by the U.S. military 
in Greenland, despite the fact that Denmark’s offi  cial 
policy was to reject nuclear weapons on Danish terri-
tory during peacetime. Apparently only two people knew 
about this – the Foreign Minister (who was also Prime 
Minister at that time) and his Permanent Secretary. Th ey 
undoubtedly acted out of the belief that this was in the 
national interest, and that it was not a policy the public 
would endorse. It therefore had to be kept a secret. 
To my mind – partly coloured by personal experience 
in the Danish Diplomatic Service – there are two motiva-
tions for secret diplomacy that stand even if scrutinized 
by a high moral standard.3
Th e fi rst one is that in the age of multilateral diplomacy, 
the game has become much more complicated. Coun-
tries negotiate not with one other country, but with many 
other countries simultaneously. And the result is not con-
fi ned to one single issue, but covers a large number of 
issues as is seen e.g. in the European Union (EU), in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and in the United 
Nations (UN) and in many other international or multi-
lateral organizations. 
Th is demands the ability to weigh a concession now, 
given to one state in one issue-area, against potential fu-
ture concessions off ered in another area by other nation-
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states. A result may be seen as negative here and now 
with one nation-state seen as the loser, but concessions 
in the pipeline from other nation-states may alter the 
equation and ultimately produce a win-win situation for 
nation states. 
Th e crucial point is that if the country off ering a 
concession now cannot be sure of getting something in 
return at a later stage and in another context, it will not 
make the off er of a concession in the fi rst place. In other 
words: Leaks of secret diplomatic deals may force part-
ners in the negotiation to abandon pledges given in good 
faith during earlier negotiations, jeopardizing much of 
the structure of multilateral diplomacy. Multilateral di-
plomacy rests on the assumption that in a longer run and 
seen as a whole, all countries benefi t from international 
cooperation – but benefi ts and burdens from a specifi c 
negotiation do not necessarily accrue to the same groups 
inside a given nation-state e.g. a country may gain during 
the negotiations of agricultural prices in the EU and then 
at a later stage be asked to ‘pay’ when fi sheries quotas are 
negotiated. Th e negotiators may see the deal as benefi cial 
to the nation-state as a whole, but the fi shermen may not. 
Given the opportunity presented by leaks of such diplo-
matic understandings, special domestic interest groups 
may try to prevent the concession in the pipeline. 
Th e second motivation is strategic ambiguity. Most observ-
ers would agree that strategic ambiguity has served the 
world very well inter alia in the triangle China-Taiwan-
the U.S. 
To prevent other nation-states from taking certain 
steps, a sensible policy may be to keep them guessing 
what would happen, if they actually did take these steps. 
But such a policy cannot be enacted if open diplomacy 
forces full disclosure about the foreign policy dispositions 
of countries in any eventuality. Th e guessing game is an 
important part of diplomacy and in most cases it works 
as a barrier to confl icts. Th e majority of nation-states 
adopt a prudent posture when they do not know what 
will happen if they do something other nation-states have 
signalled will be met with opposition. My professional 
experience is that the overwhelming majority of govern-
ments are risk aversive in foreign policy. 
In a way we can say that open diplomacy in certain 
circumstances can tie the hands of governments in ex-
actly the same way as secret diplomacy did before World 
War I. If nation-states and their governments publicly 
have committed themselves, the situation is not much 
diff erent. Th ey have to act according to their statements 
and resolutions adopted in parliaments and pledges dur-
ing electoral campaigns.
In sum room of manoeuvre combined with wilful am-
biguity are some of diplomacy’s fi nest instruments – and 
it is hard to reconcile such instruments with openness. 
What did Wikileaks tell us?
Th e amount of diplomatic cables made public is enor-
mous to be frank: 251,287 according to a fi gure men-
tioned in September 2011.4 And yet the multitude of ca-
bles tell us very little we did not know or suspected about 
U.S. foreign policy already. In my opinion the following 
conclusions can be drawn from the Wikileaks.
Th e fi rst one is that U.S. diplomacy is a gigantic machine, 
reaching far beyond classic diplomacy concentrated on 
foreign- and security policy items. U.S. diplomats looked 
for evidence of a wide range of policies of nation-states, 
covering even societal policies e.g. What does the country 
intend to do, what is its social fabric and how can it be 
expected to act in the future.
Recently, collection of what is called ‘big data’ – or 
‘mega data’ – has attracted attention as an instrument 
for predicting future trends (Weinberger 2011, 32-37). 
Th e basic idea behind the ‘big data’ idea is to simulate 
not specifi c topics but everything all at once thus getting 
answers or probabilities out of the data input. Th e U.S. 
diplomatic machine does not collect ‘big data’ as such, 
but bears a certain resemblance in its seemingly unwrit-
ten drive to collect data from all sources and areas in 
order to shape a coherent picture of what other countries 
intend to do. Reviewing the magnitude of data published 
by Wikileaks, it is amazing what we have here.
Th e missing point – which the theory about ‘big data’ 
tries to plug – is how to put all these pieces of data to-
gether – a model or theory so to speak. Comparing the 
diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks with the actual 
U.S. diplomacy, it is evident that this is exactly where 
the U.S. failed. All the information is evidently there, 
but the method to combine the data to form a holistic 
picture is absent. It is a kind of fast stream river rushing 
downstream without any kind of control.
Th ere is one more conclusion to draw from the discus-
sion about ‘big data’, which is the changing perception of 
knowledge or the shift of borderlines between objectivity 
and subjectivity (Møller 2011: 12).5 Over the last cou-
ple of centuries we have grown used to see knowledge 
as something objective – something that could be veri-
fi ed. We relied on scientifi c methods refi ned over many 
decades to get to the truth, which subsequently was la-
belled knowledge. But Wikileaks shows how ‘big data’ 
transforms knowledge from objectivity to subjectivity. 
Th e large stream of data being cabled in from capitals 
around the world is clearly not undisputed truths. In fact 
JØRGEN ØRSTRØM MØLLER TEMA 21
it gives rise to many arguments pro et contra, with dif-
ferent sources in the cables taking diff erent views Gradu-
ally, almost without really noticing, we see that data is 
something we can infl uence.
Science itself has since the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle in quantum mechanics from 1925 moved away 
from pure objectivity towards as the words indicate un-
certainty and more inaccuracy. In scientifi c terms this is 
obviously a watershed, but it may be even more important 
in implanting the fundamental philosophy that things 
are not so certain and accurate as science over several 
hundred of years had taught. In 1958 Norwood Russell 
Hanson put forward his theory that what we see is not 
objective, but that the result of observing something de-
pends to a certain degree on the observer; what our senses 
receive is actually fi ltered sensory information. 
Most non-scientists have not really bothered about 
this change of direction in science, but with the data-
stream, it becomes something relevant for the future di-
rection of our societies.
Th e second conclusion is the confi rmation of how much 
the U.S. relies on computerized input. Indeed one of the 
explanations for Wikileaks is that the data were there, 
available, having been collected by the US foreign policy 
machine. 
Old-fashioned diplomacy was much more depend-
ent on human contacts supplying qualifi ed information. 
Th e people who collected the information had used most 
of their lives to build up an understanding of the back-
ground and implications of the events they observed. 
Wikileaks reveals a trend towards raw quantitative data 
– information yes, but to a large degree unqualifi ed and 
non-evaluated information.  
What strikes a diplomat when reading through the 
Wikileaks cables is the raw nature of data coming into 
the U.S. State Department. Th ere is nothing per se wrong 
with raw data, provided that somewhere in the pipeline 
some kind of examination or systematization of the data 
takes place. With Wikileaks this seems not to have been 
the case. As has been illustrated by subsequent analysis 
of the information available prior to the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001, all the information predicting 
the attack was there, but the ability to put the pieces 
together was not6. 
For a diplomat with 38 years of foreign policy expe-
rience, it seems evident that information is useless, if a 
machinery to analyse it to form a broader picture has not 
been established. What is the use of knowing the think-
ing of a large number of people, if that does not lead us 
to know or be able to predict what the country’s policies 
are going to be? 
Th ere has been much talk about a coming new age of 
diplomacy after Wikileaks, where anybody may poten-
tially get access to anything. An equally important con-
clusion to draw – and question – is how much personal 
diplomacy, personal relations, and qualifi ed, individual 
judgment has been pushed into the background.
Th e third conclusion is – for many somewhat surprising 
but in a way rather ironic – the U.S. actually means what 
it says! Even close scrutiny of the vast amount of docu-
ments does not really point to discrepancies between pub-
lic statements and offi  cial policy on the one hand and 
what U.S. diplomats around the world actually do on the 
other hand. Th ere is a high degree of congruity, which 
creates credibility about U.S. diplomacy. Many observ-
ers and critics of the U.S. will certainly be disappointed 
about such a disclosure. Some of them may retort that the 
discrepancy, which they want to see, is found if we knew 
equally well what the CIA or similar agencies were doing. 
Very little harm – if any harm at all – is being done to 
U.S. foreign policy room of manoeuvre at home.
Th e fourth conclusion may also come as a surprise at least 
for those acquainted with old-fashioned diplomacy. 
Much of the data is about what the U.S. is saying to other 
nation-states and how American diplomats are trying to 
persuade other nation-states what their policies should 
be. Genuine and old-fashioned diplomacy was primarily 
about fi nding out the intentions of what the host coun-
try intends. Th e golden rule was not to interfere in the 
domestic politics of other nation-states – if not for other 
reasons, then because interference would potentially re-
duce the amount of incoming information. Usually, peo-
ple do not want to be told by foreign diplomats what their 
country should do or mean.
Th is is, however, how diplomacy carried out by large 
and more powerful nation-states has developed over the 
recent decades. My own personal experience bears wit-
ness to this. Ambassadors from larger countries often 
came to see me – not to hear about the Danish position, 
but rather to tell me what it should be or explain why 
Denmark should try to convince some other countries 
that their positions were wrong. I recall an ambassador 
coming to see me about an American initiative for US-
EU cooperation. We agreed that it was not clear what the 
US actually wanted, and subsequently he went on to say 
“as it is not clear what they mean, why don’t we explain 
to them what they mean”.
Th e U.S. as a global superpower is pursuing certain 
goals in its diplomacy through diplomats stationed in 
foreign countries. Wikileaks discloses how this big ma-
chine is used not only to safeguard American interests, 
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but also to try to alter the policies of other nation-states 
in a direction conducive to American interests. Th ere are 
serious doubts about the soundness of such an approach 
in the long run. American diplomacy has been extremely 
eff ective in what could be termed grand strategy i.e. over-
arching policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or vis-a-vis 
China. But the subtlety of US foreign policy when deal-
ing with medium sized powers and small nation-states 
has never won much praise. When you carry a big stick, 
it is apparently diffi  cult not to let the person on the other 
side of table know that this is indeed the case.
Th e fi fth conclusion is that a large number of political lead-
ers in other countries have adopted a diff erent – some-
times the completely opposite – attitude than the coun-
try’s well-known and publicly stated policy, when dealing 
with the U.S.
Wikileaks reveals that most – if not all – of the coun-
tries in the Middle East favour action against Iran to 
prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. Th is does 
not come as a surprise to people following foreign- and 
security policy. We know it as the raison d’être of nation-
states. Politics is dictated by national interests and the 
countries of the Middle East know that a nuclear Iran 
will destabilise the balance of power in the region – with 
ramifi cations far beyond Israel (Th e fear of a nuclear Iran 
may be more manifest in some of Iran’s immediate neigh-
bours).
But over the years Iran has played its hand cunningly, 
by publicly stating again and again that development of 
an Iranian nuclear bomb should be seen in the context 
of hostility towards Israel, making it diffi  cult, if not to 
say impossible, for leaders in Arab countries to speak out 
against it.
Wikileaks brought into the open, that Arab leaders 
in private conversations – notwithstanding that no such 
thing as private conversation exists between a political 
leader and an emissary from a foreign power7 – strongly 
opposed Iranian nuclear weapons and even encouraged 
the U.S. to take action. Th e private exhortations by Saudi 
Arabia’s King Abdullah for Washington to “cut off  the 
head of the [Iranian] snake”8 may again not be revelation 
for Western observers, but it may be for a large number 
of Arabs, having lived in the belief that Saudi-Arabia sup-
ported policies aimed against Israel. King Abdullah may 
thus face a problem vis-à-vis many of his own citizens and 
many citizens in other Arab countries, not only for stat-
ing this policy goal, but also for his choice of vocabulary. 
In the same way expressions detailing critical comments 
of Pakistan’s political leaders by the King of Saudi-Arabia 
and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Zayed 
will likewise give rise to lifted eyebrows in the Arab and/
or Muslim world.
Th e future of diplomacy
Much of the debate in the aftermath of Wikileaks has 
focused on whether sources will be as ready to talk as 
hitherto and whether they will weigh their words more 
carefully – even cautiously – in the future.
Th e immediate observation is that interaction be-
tween a diplomat and a source is not one sided, but a quid 
pro quo. Sources willingly enter into conversation with 
diplomats either because it is their job to communicate 
with foreign diplomats or because the source may want to 
feed some input into the decision making process of the 
foreign country in question. Th e answer to the fi rst ques-
tion is therefore that there will not be much diff erence in 
the availability of sources in the future.
Th ere may, however, be a diff erence when pondering 
about how open sources will be compared to the past and 
whether sources will use the same kind of vocabulary. 
Th is is a sensitive area. In my opinion sources – and 
I have often been a source for foreign diplomats work-
ing in Denmark – try to tune into their interlocutor for 
various reasons. It makes the conversation easier; it im-
proves the chances of getting messages through; and it 
creates goodwill, which may come in handy at other oc-
casions. Th erefore not all they say can be taken at face 
value. A seasoned diplomat understands this and distils 
the information from the source, before submitting it 
back to capitals. I do not remember one single time in 
my capacity as an Ambassador to have transmitted ad 
verbatim as Wikileaks reveals has been the case on many 
occasions. When working at headquarters and receiving 
cables from Danish diplomats, I never took such wording 
at face value, but always tried to digest what the source 
really meant, trying to understand the deeper message. 
Wikileaks disclose that many American diplomats 
did not understand this, conveying information from 
sources back to back to headquarters without reservation. 
Th is was a grave mistake. One does not need diplomats 
for doing that. No experienced and able diplomat would 
have conveyed expressions and exhortations as found on 
Wikileaks to headquarters. Th ey should have known that 
this vocabulary was used in the context of a conversation 
and, although expressing a policy stance, did not refl ect 
the full position of the host country. Headquarter has no 
need for specifi c phrases unless circumstances are spe-
cial, headquarters need input and judgment. Colourful 
language sounds good when spoken, but may lead to toe 
curling when put on paper.
Now when we know that American diplomacy and 
probably also the diplomatic services of many other coun-
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tries have forgotten this or put that priceless dictum on 
the backburner, vocabulary may change, becoming fl at, 
more obscure, more opaque and more ambiguous. Ambi-
guity is sometimes – maybe more often than not – a good 
thing in a policy stance, but it is extremely dangerous 
when collecting information and data to form a picture of 
foreign powers intentions. Th ere is a place for ambiguity 
in policy stance, but not in the analytical phase.
History has many examples of how this kind of am-
biguity has dangerous consequences. Two of them may 
have contributed to outbreak of war.
Th e fi rst example took place in the aftermath of 
World War II and may have contributed to outbreak of 
the Korean War. In February 1950 Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson gave a speech at the Press Club in Wash-
ington D.C. and mentioned the American defence perim-
eter in Asia, pointing to a map indicating that it ran be-
tween Japan and Korea. In other words Acheson seemed 
to indicate that Korea was outside, rather than inside, the 
American defence perimeter. In June 1950 North Korea 
unleashed its army against South Korea. We do not know 
exactly what reasoning was behind the attack and what – 
if any – role Dean Acheson’s speech may have played, but 
it is normally assumed that this speech was at least one of 
several indications that lead North Korea to believe that 
the U.S. might not defend South Korea (Matray 2002). 
Another example is the still on-going debate about 
the meeting between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 
and the American Ambassador April Glaspie in 1990, 
prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Th ere is no clear con-
clusion whether her statements did or did not confi rm 
Saddam Hussein in his belief that the U.S. would not 
step in to defend Kuwait. For this purpose it is suffi  cient 
to note that the American Ambassador when summoned 
without warning to the meeting did not make it abun-
dantly clear that this would be the case. Th is is no criti-
cism of her behaviour; there is no evidence to do that, but 
a statement of fact.
Th ese two events point to the risk of unclear mes-
saging. Wikileaks will push conversations between dip-
lomats and their sources in the direction of boring and 
sometimes obscure vocabulary, making it harder for dip-
lomats to get the sense of what the host country intends 
to do. A seasoned diplomat, a good diplomat, will not 
depend on the exact wording and will probe until he/
she knows for sure what they have come to fi nd out. But 
as history shows not all diplomats fall in this category, 
unfortunately. In short: Wikileaks enhances the risk of 
incomplete information gathering, because sources will 
be more cautious and ambiguous when talking to diplo-
mats, thus making it more diffi  cult for diplomats to get a 
fi nal sense of what the host country intends to do. 
A second risk stemming from Wikileaks is that sen-
sitive information gathering takes place outside normal 
diplomatic circles, using non-diplomatic channels. Sen-
sitive information may even be transmitted verbally to 
avoid archives and risks of subsequent leaks.
Obviously this increases the risk of misunderstand-
ings and ambiguity. Sources outside normal diplomatic 
channels are associated with greater risk in the sense that 
they may not be used to talk with diplomats. Th ey may 
not have the same access to government policies as ‘seri-
ous’ sources, but unwilling to admit so. Th e quality of 
sources diminishes. It may also be unclear what they ac-
tually said if transmitting procedures outside established 
channels are used inter alia if it is done verbally through 
special emissaries.
As the Cuban missile crisis as well as Henry Kiss-
inger’s preliminary talks when establishing contact with 
China showed, channels outside diplomacy have been 
used successfully, but again this primarily took place in 
exceptional circumstances.
Th e real impact on diplomacy of Wikileaks is, how-
ever, to be found in an analysis of how Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) i.e. facebook, twit-
ter and other social media changes diplomacy. Th e U.S. 
government has set up a centre that follows up to 5 mil-
lion tweets a day. Th e centre also pores over “Facebook, 
newspapers, TV news channels, local radio stations, and 
Internet chat rooms — anything overseas that anyone can 
access and contribute to openly”.9
Th ere are three major and fundamental changes in 
the pipeline. Th e fi rst one is the ability of a given coun-
try to conduct a swift analysis of the public reaction in 
foreign countries of this particular country’s own for-
eign- and security policy initiatives. Th e U.S. for example 
does that after major Presidential speeches or other policy 
steps (e.g. the killing of Osama bin Laden) to gauge the 
reaction of – not offi  cial sources or governments – but 
the public. Th is gives an immediate picture of the public 
sentiment. As phrased in the source referred to in the 
previous paragraph:
“From Arabic to Mandarin Chinese, from an angry 
tweet to a thoughtful blog, the analysts gather the 
information, often in native tongue. They cross-
reference it with the local newspaper or a 
clandestinely intercepted phone conversation. 
From there, they build a picture sought by the 
highest levels at the White House, giving a 
real-time peek, for example, at the mood of a 
region after the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama 
bin Laden or perhaps a prediction of which 
Mideast nation seems ripe for revolt”.
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Th e second change is the deeper understanding of what 
moves outside offi  cial circles in a country and which 
trends are emerging with the necessary public support to 
ultimately engineer changes. Most diplomats recall how 
unexpected the uprising in Iran in 1979 against the Shah 
was. Many people would think that the uprising in Egypt 
against President Mubarak also came as a surprise – albeit 
not in the same league. But for the CIA-unit monitor-
ing facebook, twitter etc. it did not. Th e centre knew of 
the discontent brewing in the Egyptian population and 
something like this would eventually come, even though 
the centre could not foresee exactly how and when. But it 
was enough to warn the U.S. government and may have 
been instrumental in the U.S. policy response, inform-
ing the U.S. government that the uprising enjoyed broad 
popular support and consequently that President Mu-
barak could not be kept in power irrespective of whether 
American interest pointed in that direction or not.
Compared to such analysis of ICT (with resem-
blances to ‘big data’) traditional diplomacy falls short. 
Indeed traditional diplomacy may get it wrong, because 
it draws predominantly on established sources. It is well-
known that the U.S. for many years relied – at least partly 
– on intelligence services in a number of Middle East 
countries (including Egypt), not so much to know about 
other countries, but to know about the country in ques-
tion. Th e danger or risk is that if domestic intelligence 
services get it wrong, as they did in Iran prior to 1979 and 
may have done in Egypt when the Arab Spring erupted, 
the U.S. also gets it wrong. Intelligence services are not 
vaccinated against human errors and shortcomings in the 
sense that they are lured into seeing and thinking what 
they expect to see. Th ey are also bureaucracies driving 
in the familiar side of the road and have evidently not 
in several cases been able to understand the implications 
of ICT for building popular support for or against the 
incumbent regime.
Th e third change may be the most intriguing one. It is 
the ability to manage foreign- and security policy over 
the heads of other governments, building coalitions or 
understandings with the people in other countries.
To a certain extent this was what President Obama 
tried to do with his speeches in Istanbul (April 2009) 
when he addressed the Middle East problems and a cou-
ple of months later when he addressed the Muslim world 
with a major speech in Cairo (June 2009). Th e aim may 
have been less to communicate with the political lead-
ers in the region whom he knew quite well, but rather 
to reach out to the peoples in the region, trying to rally 
them behind alternative policies than the established line 
of thinking in these countries.
Technically, it may be possible to block or at least 
make such behaviour diffi  cult and reduce its impact, but 
in the long run it is a lost battle as the message can and 
will be conveyed through ICT to the population. We 
do not know whether President Obama’s two speeches 
played a role in what happened two years later in the Arab 
Spring, but it is possible that it fi tted into one of many 
converging trends, pushing the populations of the Arab 
countries towards protests demanding regime changes.
Traditional diplomacy fi nds it diffi  cult – maybe even 
impossible – to compete with this new and strong instru-
ment for reaching out. A diplomat is constrained by a 
number of rules, which cannot be neglected. Th e host 
country expects diplomats to play by these rules and if 
they do not, they may be denied access to sources and in 
the worst cases be asked to leave the country as a persona 
non grata. No such inhibitions exist for using ICT to 
go beyond the governments and appeal directly to the 
people.
Conclusion
Th e following conclusions can be drawn from Wikileaks:
• Wikileaks had little impact on the U.S. itself as con-
gruity between offi  cial policy and diplomacy abroad 
was demonstrated.
• Wikileaks had some impact on foreign countries, es-
pecially in the Middle East, where political leaders 
were caught supporting U.S. policies, which they had 
publicly denounced.
• More prudence and more ambiguous use of vocabu-
lary in the future among sources, boding a deteriora-
tion of the quality of information gathered by diplo-
mats abroad.
• A huge swing away from traditional diplomacy to 
the increasing use of ICT as both an instrument in 
intelligence gathering, but also as a new method of 
reaching out to the populations bypassing recalcitrant 
governments.
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Notes
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2. France will act in accordance with its interests.
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5. Objectivity versus subjectivity is discussed in my book How Asia 
Can Shape the World – From the Era of Plenty to the era of Scarcities.
6. Th e same was the case prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor 7 Decem-
ber 1941.
7. During the Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. at the eleventh hour of-
fered the Soviet Union what Attorney General Robert Kennedy and 
Ambassador Dobrynin understood as a ‘private’ deal about U.S. 
missiles in Turkey. Th e words ¨private’ covered that it was never to 
be made public and if mentioned publicly would be denied by the 
U.S. Th is case off ers an example of the virtues of secret diplomacy 
under special circumstances.
8. Council on Foreign Relations (1 December 2010): Will WikiLeaks 
Hobble U.S. Diplomacy?. Retrieved on 12 March 2012 at http://
www.cfr.org/diplomacy/wikileaks-hobble-us-diplomacy/p23526 
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